Mathieu H – 29/05/2019
In Shakespeare’s play Julius Caesar, Anthony, Caesar’s faithful consul, recites an elegy on his master’s tomb after his assassination by the senators that had plotted against him. The extract (below) has great impact in delivering the effect intended by the consul namely restoring the honour of his master, in order that he can rest in peace and be mourned.
Come I to speak in Caesar’s funeral.
He was my friend, faithful and just to me:
But Brutus says he was ambitious;
And Brutus is an honourable man.
He hath brought many captives home to Rome Whose ransoms did the general coffers fill:
Did this in Caesar seem ambitious?
When that the poor have cried, Caesar hath wept: Ambition should be made of sterner stuff:
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious;
And Brutus is an honourable man.
You all did see that on the Lupercal
I thrice presented him a kingly crown,
Which he did thrice refuse: was this ambition? Yet Brutus says he was ambitious;
And, sure, he is an honourable man.1
One is quick to notice the variation between the meaning of the first, second and third utterance of the phrase “he (Brutus) is an honourable man” and yet the words do not vary. This highlights a divide of great interest in philosophy of language, the divide between the intended and literal meaning of sentences. This divide is explored in the works of philosophers of the pragmatic school, namely Austin, Searle, and Grice. We shall extract from their studies philosophical understandings concerning the difference between what is uttered and what is meant.
Speech Acts and Performative Utterances
J. L. Austin’s theory of speech acts (further developed by J. R. Searle) is of particular relevance to our exploration. Austin2 by defining expressed sentences as actions or what he called ‘performative utterances’, diverged from the truth-based evaluations of meaning that had been used until then for the philosophical analysis of language and oriented the debate towards sentence meaning as perceived through usage. That is to say he did not define meaning as dependent on an objective ideal of the described (its truth) but rather as dependent on context and intention. Austin defined the intended meaning of sentences, as comprised of two aspects or contents: First a locutionary content, attached to the words themselves (as they are pronounced or written); and second an illocutionary content dependent on the intent given to the locutionary content by externalities. Orally, illocutionary content can be found in the way a sentence is intonated, if one says, ‘what have you done’ in a neutral interrogative manner, its intended meaning will be different from the same sentence pronounced with anger. But a myriad of other factors can come into play, material surroundings being one of them. If after a dispute your friend waves his fist, leaves the room and says ‘I dare you to follow me’ it will have an entirely different meaning than when someone says the same sentence (in the same tone) before jumping from a springboard into a pool.
The example given in the introduction is a particularly interesting one as the variation of the expression’s intended meaning (illocutionary force) is due to its repetition and to the increasing awareness the reader has of the consul’s intent, given by the surrounding sentences.
The distinction Austin’s speech act theory makes between two types of sentence content, renders explicit the fact that literal (locutionary) meaning isn’t necessarily equivalent to intended meaning and that another factor (illocution) is sometimes necessary to define meaning. In other words, the theory explains the difference between a sentence’s intendedmeaning and literal one by showing that intended meaning depends not only on locutionary content but also on illocutionary force. Concluding that if one of the two is not present, intended meaning is often, if not always, undiscernible: without literal (locutionary) content there is no sentence and therefore no meaning (be it intended or not)3 and without illocutionary content, sentences will stay open to varying interpretations like the ones described above.
The Cooperative Principle
Here it is wise to add that it is for the hearer and not for the speaker that the interpretation of what is intended is unclear, as one may hope people speak with predefined intentions4. In the first example given, Caesar’s loyal Consul evidently knew where he was going before the hearer did. This is understood when the extract (of Shakespeare’s play) is read for a second time, with previous knowledge of Anthony’s (Caesar’s consul) real intention, leading to a much stronger perception of intended meaning than upon first reading. Indeed, upon second reading, the intended meaning perceived varies much less from sentence to sentence as one knows from the get-go how to interpret the words.
According to H. P. Grice speaker and hearer meanings are linked by a cooperative principle5 (the two parties’ mutual goal of communicating agreed meaning) implying that the speaker should adapt the intention of his sentences to no more and no less than what is needed for understanding by the hearer. The assumption of perfect adherence to the cooperative principle by the speaker, along with the assumption of optimal hearer intendment, would indeed make the two meanings (speaker and hearer) equivalent. In the case of the elegy, its interpretation in a holistic manner, considering the entirety of the extract as a unique sentence, would make the speaker’s intended meaning clear to the hearer and solve the problem of differing views of intended meanings for speaker and hearer. This further illustrates the previous point, the dependence on illocutionary content, as the sentences in bold needs the context provided by all the others to be properly understood.
The Associative Theory of Meaning
Although the theory of speech acts is enlightening for particular types of sentences, namely performative utterances, it seems to fall short when confronted with certain constative utterances. Indeed, in extreme examples even the combination of locutionary and illocutionary contents may be insufficient to explain full meaning. This is the case for certain expressions, metaphors and figurative formulations: If we were to take the idiom ‘It’s raining cats and dogs’, not only would the locutionary content, taken literally, lead us nowhere near the intended meaning, the contextual illocutionary content wouldn’t necessarily be sufficient for us to deduce what the speaker meant either. This is where Grice’s distinction between speaker and sentence meaning may have stronger analytical value than Austin’s.
Grice defines speaker-meaning in associative terms of the form: when an individual says X he means Y6. Many examples of this non-direct way of expression can be found in communication between humans and electronic objects. Most of us know that when a car starts beeping it is because one is attempting to steal or damage it but the only reason such a symbol is understood is because we (as hearers) are accustomed to associating beeping noises with danger or alarm. Grice argues that communication through language functions in the same manner. His theory, that of association, has the advantage of explaining the meaning of very abstract sentences such as ‘it’s raining cats and dogs’. Indeed, if the phrase ‘it’s raining cats and dogs’ is automatically assigned the intended meaning ‘it’s raining heavily’ when one is speaking English, then one bypasses the need to uncertainly extract the intended meaning from the literal (and illocutionary) contents. This shift of focus from conversational implicatures (Austin) to the modalities of abstract but conventional usage7 gives a more independent theory of communication.
Nevertheless, meaning most of the time can be derived from the literal meaning complemented by its illocutionary force and one may ask if Grice’s theory really best explains intended meaning. Idioms being in most part derived from everyday occurrences they are easy to guess when in appropriate context and when supplied with sufficient illocutionary force. Furthermore, it can be argued that a correct use of Grice’s theory would entail taking into account both literal and intended meaning. If one were to assign meaning mechanically to the sentences given as examples in the section above (Speech Acts and Performative Utterances) one would misunderstand one of the two intents of the sentence ‘I dare you to follow me’. Indeed, abiding by Grice’s theory restrains the meanings we can assign to literal content as the same words can only contain one meaning.
Concluding Statement
Having started with an example I deem fit to end with one as well and have chosen the particularly contentious one of religious symbolism. In the practice of communion, the wine drunk and the bread eaten is compared with the flesh and the blood of Christ through Jesus’ own words: ‘This is my body, […] this is my blood’. Most would agree that the intended meaning of this sentence, the Lord’s charity and generosity, can easily be extracted from the literal meaning of the sentence without belief in its literal application. This doesn’t mean that the literal meaning is not needed, as it is necessary for us to grasp the intended message, but that once the point made, this literal meaning can then be disregarded. Nevertheless, this interpretation is not shared by all, for although Anglicans treat the sentence as a symbol, Catholics stay attached to the literal content and this despite being primarily interested in the moral message conveyed. This illustrates that whilst some believe that literal meaning is a means to an end, others believe it to be part of the end. In this case, the Catholics maintain that validity of the literal content is to be built upon even for figurative intention. Catholics therefore stay attached to the arguments for material transubstantiation in order to feel the intended (figurative) meaning strengthened or justified. When for others attachment to the material (literal) arguments entail on the contrary a loss of credibility for the doctrine and what they perceive to be its true message.
Independently of thoughts on the above and on which theory (Austin or Grice’s) is found most convincing, the interesting question raised by this essay is whether intended meaning’s presidency over literal meaning should be complete (rendering literal meaning null in figurative contexts) or whether it should preserve attachment to literal content and meaning. In this sense I find that Grice’s and Austin’s theories differ in analysis, Grice interpreting literal content more as a container that serves intended meaning whilst Austin seems to consider literal meaning as an essential part of intended meaning.
This shows that despite generally giving similar interpretations of the divide between literal and intended meaning, the theory of speech acts and Grice’s associative theory may each best cover a different field of expression. Although one may be more adapted to explain abstract metaphorical contexts of which the origins have been forgotten (Grice) the other better explains everyday statements, interjections, and expressions of which the meaning can and should be contextually derived (Austin). One may find great use for the understanding of both, as using them in combination as well as interchangeably assists in extracting from language its meaning and to greater grasp Putnam’s linguistic division of labour.
Notes
[1] W. Shakespeare (2002) Julius Caesar, p. 76.
[2] J. L. Austin (1961) Performative Utterances, pp. 291-300
[3] There may be gestural meaning, but we are here focusing on language and will therefore disregard this eventuality or consider it to be akin to literal content.
[4] H. P. Grice (1957) Meaning, p. 290.
[5] H. P. Grice (1961) Logic and Conversation, pp. 314-315; Bach, K. (1972) Conversational Impliciture.
[6] H. P. Grice (1957), Meaning, pp. 285-286. Derived from Grice’s definition of non-natural meaning.
[7] H. P. Grice (1961), Logic and Conversation, pp. 317.
Bibliography
Austin, J. L. (1961) Performative Utterances [in] The Philosophy of Language. Ed. Martinich and Sosa.
Bach, K. (1972) Conversational Impliciture, [in] The Philosophy of Language. Ed. Martinich and Sosa.
Grice, H. P. (1957) Meaning [in] The Philosophy of Language. Ed. Martinich and Sosa.
Grice, H. P. (1975) Logic and Conversation [in] The Philosophy of Language. Ed. Martinich and Sosa.
Searle, J. R. (1969) The Structure of Illocutionary Acts [in] The Philosophy of Language. Ed. Martinich and Sosa. Shakespeare, W. (2002) Julius Caesar. Webster’s Thesaurus edn. San Diego: Icon Classics.