Lucy Mcilroy
I will argue in this essay that thinking for yourself is deeply uncomfortable and that humans choose to not think for themselves as a form of protection. I will make three arguments to support this. Firstly, the argument that it is not unnatural for humans to think for themselves, but that we are sometimes taught not to question. Secondly, that wilful ignorance is often used to avoid recognising truths that distress us, or do not serve us. Lastly, the argument that there is a material risk that comes with speaking out after thinking for oneself. While there are many, the main challenge of thinking for yourself is accepting the responsibility that comes with original ideas. Overall, I will argue that the challenges that come with thinking for themselves lead people to actively choose “not thinking”, as the more appealing option.
An important distinction must first be made to define the term ‘not thinking’. ‘Not thinking’ can be either an active choice or involuntary (in that the individual does not have the means to think for themselves to the extent that this essay demands of humans). This involuntary inability to think for yourself could be due to factors such as age or cognitive disabilities. This essay will therefore only refer to the active ‘not thinking’ which is a choice, either conscious or subconscious.
Firstly, it is not unnatural for humans to think for themselves, rather, we are sometimes taught not to. This poses the challenge of having to unlearn this ideology in order to think for ourselves. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir argues that a woman is “taught… [to] renounce her autonomy” and is treated like a “living doll” [1]. By repeating this verb “taught’, Beauvoir is implying not only that this passivity (not thinking for ourselves or taking action) is not innate, but that a woman is initially autonomous, capable of individual thoughts. Other groups also face the challenge of having to unlearn passivity in order to think for themselves: for example, the members of the sixteenth-century French society that was observed by the Tupinambá representatives, as described by Montaigne [2]. These observations include the fact that the King’s entourage did not question their subservient role to the child King. Following a similar line of argument, the second observation was that those living in poverty “put up with such injustice” and that they did not take matters into their own hands in equalizing the wealth distribution [3]. In this, the Tupinambá pose the question: why are they not thinking for themselves? The fact that the Tupinambá can question these issues proves that this is not an innate belief. Yet the Europeans – even those whom the system impacted such as the poor – did not question it as they had been taught to simply accept the way that things were. Instead of unnatural, thinking for yourself is the natural thing for us to do, and it is this that defines us as humans.
In his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau’s claim that it is ‘freedom’ and ‘perfectibility’ that separate us from animals is a similar argument, particularly the latter, which refers to our ability to learn and create new and better ways of living [4]. This is also supported by Descartes’ Discourse on the Method, in which he proposes that what he calls “good sense” – the ability to think for ourselves and make decisions – “is the only thing that makes us human and distinguishes us from brute beasts” [5]. By thinking for ourselves, we are fulfilling our potential as humans by using our reason. It is by questioning and thinking that we evolve as individuals, as a society, and as a species. Therefore, while humans have sometimes been taught not to think for themselves, the opposite is more natural.
Secondly, wilful ignorance is often used by individuals to avoid thinking for themselves about information that does not serve their purpose or makes them uncomfortable. Wilful ignorance – or professed ignorance – removes the guilt of avoiding thinking for yourself as it often appears to be true ignorance, which carries no responsibility. One example of this is how contemporary readers of Montaigne’s essay On the Cannibals [6] were faced with his claim that the Tupinambá people were not the barbarians that Montaigne’s European readers believed them to be [7]. Montaigne argues that the Europeans “surpass them [the Tupinambá people] in every kind of barbarianism” [8]. This claim is uncomfortable for his contemporary readers just to accept, for as one critic (Bakewell) observes, Montaigne “[draws out the] contrast with France and the implications for European assumptions of superiority” [9]. Montaigne’s reader is not only asked to reflect on the flaws of their own culture, but also to consider whether the European treatment of the indigenous people of Brazil is justified. Historians such as Patricia Seed argue that throughout the Western imperial efforts in the 15th-17th centuries, the barbarous nature –specifically the cannibalistic tendencies – of the native peoples in the colonies were used to justify both the imperialism and enslavement of them [10]. As a result, the reader is forced to reconsider whether how the native people were treated by their fellow Frenchmen was moral as well as address any unconscious biases that they hold. This is a far more uncomfortable position than not reflecting on the truth of the claims regarding the Tupinambá people’s barbarity. To a modern audience, it seems shocking that Western society would tolerate ideas such as ethnic superiority, but the intolerance of a belief commonly held, demands personal sacrifice.
A further example of active wilful ignorance can be seen in the social context around Descartes’ writing. For example, the refusal of scholars such as Cremonini even to look through Galileo’s telescope in the early seventeenth century, because it would affirm heliocentric claims that they did not support [11]. Equally, the University of Utrecht attempted to silence Descartes through a lawsuit, because Descartes had challenged the authority of the old philosophy they taught [12]. The unwillingness of intellectuals – whose professions it is- to think for themselves highlights how challenging the task can be.
Wilful ignorance is also used to retain privileges that the individual holds while not thinking for themselves. In The Second Sex [13], Beauvoir points out that some women use wilful ignorance to keep their status as the “other”, and “all the advantages an alliance with the superior caste” [14] offers them. One example is economic advantages. Beauvoir also mentions the privilege of avoiding “the metaphysical risk” [15] that comes with defining one’s own meaning and purpose, which can be daunting. It is far more comfortable to let someone else validate your existence. By retaining their position as the “other” [16], Beauvoir argues that women allow men to validate their existence and define their purpose. Descartes also recognizes a metaphysical risk, regarding his ‘Method of Doubt’ [17], stating that “the doubt should not … be applied to ordinary life” [18] because it could lead someone into existential meaninglessness. Edward Craig comments that he is “amazed” at Descartes’ positivity after so much doubt [19]. It is far easier to remain passive by not taking responsibility by thinking for yourself. Wilful ignorance clearly can be used to avoid uncomfortable truths to retain privilege, as well as avoiding any form of existentialism that comes when having to decide one’s own purpose.
Lastly, there is also a material risk that comes with separating yourself from the common beliefs and values of the community. This comes with speaking out about what conclusions you have come to by thinking for yourself. The material risk includes the possibility of losing your source of income, or social network. This risk is evident in Descartes’ hesitancy to publish the Discours, which was, according to the biographer Smith, on account of the “theologico-politicalcontext” [20], and for fear of condemnation such as that of Galileo in 1634. Furthermore, Descartes denies intending “to teach the method”, instead using the verb “to speak” [21], denying responsibility over the impact that it has on others. For Descartes, while he is still willing to think for himself, the risk of social rejection and religious condemnation prevented him from expressing those thoughts blatantly.
Similarly, Montaigne was aware of the possible backlash that his opinions would bring and protects himself by making it a “private” matter for his “friends and kinsmen” [22]. Both authors were clearly aware of the risk of alienation that comes with questioning the accepted ideas of society. However, Montaigne does show more willingness to criticise religious and cultural practices than Descartes. For example, he describes the actions of the Europeans excused by “duty and religion” as barbaric [23]. He also makes observations about the “injustice” of the wealth divide, and the satirical jab at French prioritization of civility (“Ah! But they wear no breeches…”) [24]. Yet, Montaigne takes precautions, such as the latter example being a jest rather than an outspoken complaint. This is supported by the critic Marchi, who claims that Montaigne “refuses self-sacrifice” by avoiding “indubitable condemnation” [25] of his culture. Montaigne is aware that writing a serious political statement would mean relinquishing things such as his social standing and instead writes a piece of work that he describes as “frivolous and vain” [26]. In this, he uses captatio benevolentiae. Although the particulars of the threats that Descartes and Montaigne faced (such as ex-communication) no longer apply in the same way for a thinker living in the 21st century, the threat exists in other forms. For example, the 21st century phenomenon of ‘cancel culture’ poses a significant challenge for any public figure wanting to think for themselves and question norms. For both 16th-17th century writers, as well as modern thinkers, the risk of alienation or condemnation that comes with speaking out against the crowd makes it far easier for them to avoid thinking for themselves in the first place.
In conclusion not thinking for yourself is often the more comfortable route, because of the many challenges that come with actively thinking, and the responsibility given to those who do think for themselves. It is more comfortable not to think for ourselves because what our culture believes and teaches us is familiar. Accepting these beliefs poses no challenge. Furthermore, the risk of speaking out about controversial thoughts or opinions often prevents individuals from thinking for themselves in the first place, as they are then able to feign (true) ignorance, and not take responsibility for any controversial claim that they find truth in. As soon as individuals do have thoughts that are contrary to that of society, a sense of obligation often drives them to speak on it or to take action. Not thinking for yourself is the only way to avoid this responsibility. The possibility that you might discover something that goes against what you previously believed is the overarching challenge and the primary reason that people avoid thinking for themselves.
[1] Simone, De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, (London: Vintage Books, 2011) pg. 305.
2[] Michel de Montaigne, ‘On the Cannibals’, in The Essays: A Selection, ed. by M.A. Screech (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 452-453.
[3] Ibid. p467.
[4] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, (New York: Open Road Integrated Medea, 2010, ProQuest Ebook Central [Accessed November 29, 2023], pp.19-21.
[5] René Descartes and Ian Maclean, A Discourse on the Method (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2008), p. 5.
[6] Michel de Montaigne, ‘On the Cannibals’, in The Essays: A Selection, ed. by M.A. Screech (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 79-92.
[7] H.E. Martel, ‘Hans Staden’s Captive Soul: Identity, Imperialism, and Rumors of Cannibalism in Sixteenth-Century Brazil’, Journal of World History, Vol. 17. No. 1 (2006), 51-69 (p. 51).
[8] Michel de Montaigne, ‘On the Cannibals’, in The Essays: A Selection, ed. by M.A. Screech (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 79-92.
[9] Sarah Bakewell, How to Live: a Life of Montaigne in One Question and Twenty Attempts at an Answer, (London: Vintage, 2011), 185-186.
[10] Patricia Seed, American Pentimento: the Invention of Indians and the Pursuit of Riches, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 103-104.
[11] Stillman Drake, ‘Galileo and the Career of Philosophy’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 38. No. 1 (1977), pp. 19-32, (p.22).
[12] Igor Agostini, ‘Descartes’s Proofs of God and the Crisis of Thomas Aquinas’s Five Ways in Early Modern Thomism: Scholastic and Cartesian Debates.’, The Harvard Theological Review, vol. 108, no. 2, (2015), pp. 235–62 (p.239).
[13] Simone de Beauvoir, Constance Borde, Sheila Malovany-Chevallier, The Second Sex, (London: Vintage Books, 2011).
[14] Ibid. p38. 15 Ibid. p.30.
[15] Ibid. p30.
[16] Ibid. p.38.
[17] René Descartes and Ian Maclean, A Discourse on the Method (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2008), pp. 21-28.
[18] René Descartes, ‘Part I. Of the Principles of Human Knowledge’, in Principles of Philosophy (United States: Dancing Unicorn Press, 2016).
[19] Edward Craig, ‘Some more high spots’, in Philosophy: a very short introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. Page 74-80 (p. 77).
[20] Steven Smith, ‘An Exemplary Life: The Case of René Descartes’, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 57. No. 3 (2004), pp.571-597 (p. 576).
[21] Descartes and Maclean, A Discourse on the Method, p. 24.
[22] Montaigne, Screech; The Essays, p. 96.
[23] Ibid. p. 433.
[24] Montaigne, Screech; The Essays, p.453.
[25] Dudley Marchi, “Montaigne and the New World: The Cannibalism of Cultural Production.” Modern Language Studies 23, no. 4 (1993): 35–54. p48.
[26] Montaigne, Screech; The Essays, p.97.
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