Charlie Theodosius
I wrote the following commentary last year. It seems apt to publish it in Notion as it concerns Hegel’s philosophy and, as such, his concept of the Notion.
I preface my commentary with my starting and underlying premise, my reason for doing so will be made explicit throughout the following commentary. My premise is this: Hegel wrote his Preface, the passage I comment on and, the entire Phenomenology of Spirit as a fundamentally Christian Philosopher, in his terms. I will bring out what I mean by ‘his terms’ within the commentary itself.
It may seem misguided to attempt a short commentary on a passage the length of §20-25, (as sectioned in Miller’s 1977 translation), of Hegel’s Preface but, this is exactly what Hegel’s philosophy demands. As dialectic it is only complete in its entirety. This pertains both to the argument I ascertain to be in this passage and the Preface as a whole; in fact, it applies to the entirety of Hegel’s work by virtue of his philosophy. What is meant by this shall be illuminated throughout this commentary but for now the following will suffice. There is a question as to whether the Preface should be read as a prologue or an epilogue to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Lauer asserts that it should probably be both, although he then goes on as if it is an epilogue. (Lauer, 1978, p19-20 and then in full p270-290.) His error is in suggesting that it can be read as either/or when it must always be treated as both. What is true is only made actual in its full dialectical system, (Hegel, 1977, p14/§25), that is, it starts as both substance and subject (Hegel, 1977, p10/§17) and through the system it comes to be the Notion (Hegel, 1977, p14/§25); the ultimate concept that informs reality. This can be made clear by examining the passage.
That Hegel starts with, “the True is the whole” (Hegel, 1977, p11/§20), perfectly encapsulates this dialectic. This cannot be taken alone from the following statement that the Absolute is a result. The Absolute is that which creates the whole, the beginning, God. Therefore, by the nature of the Absolute, the whole “includes its own generation.” (Yovel, 2005, p31.) What is true can only be known from the entire dialectical system, the whole, and at its start the system is not this final truth as it is only at the end that the cause can be said to be truly Absolute. Two important points can be made from this.
Firstly, the system does not objectify the Absolute as an a priori fundamental concept as in Kant but rather grounds it as simultaneously subject. That is, the same dialectical structure that pertains to the subjective world of being also applies to that from which it originates, the objective gets to obtain its objectivity as cause while also becoming subjective and so not becoming an intangible force, it is subject to the same evolution that we are as subjects. (Yovel, 2005, p32.)
Secondly, it directly pertains to the place of the Preface as both prologue and epilogue and the irony within. As truth only existed in completed system, as prologue the argument is necessarily false. It is, dialectically, untrue that “the True is the whole”, as the whole system, the rest of the book, has not yet been presented. It is however the nature of the process to state the immediate ‘truths’ at the outset and therefore, having the Preface as also epilogue is the best way of presenting it. The seemingly greater contradiction is in the Absolute being a result. In being a subject, the Absolute necessarily “entails that is a self-becoming.” (Yovel, 2005, p102.) But how can the Absolute be the Absolute if it is only so “if and insofar as it generates a world that is other than itself”? (Inwood, 2018, p1044.) The world is other than the Absolute as within it all things are only actual and subject whereas it is in addition these things.
As the Absolute is a result it has only undeveloped universality (Yovel, 2005, p102) when it is first referred to; in the case of reading the prologue it would be undeveloped when reading as prologue and developed as epilogue. At this stage what pertains to linguistic expressions denoting a thing, such as ‘the Divine’, is that they miss the meaning entirely. This is because philosophical discourse, the dialectic before reaching the meaning, requires more than such singular expressions; philosophic expressions move beyond themselves into their context. (Yovel, 2005, p102-103.) Such reductive definitional expressions are prematurely immediate and any such that they move beyond the subject do so by a “becoming-other.” (Hegel, 1977, p11/§20.) This pertains to the same contradiction in the Absolute for how can it become other? Linguistically it becomes mediated in which contradicting states become one, that is, it results from a process. (Inwood, 2018, p1047.) If this pertains to God, then He would be a synthesis not one. For Hegel this is a misunderstanding rooted in problems in inherent in the historically grounded subject/predicate use of language and as a result a misunderstanding of mediation.
The common subject/predicate usage of language is not suitable for philosophical discourse. However, historically, “the need to represent the Absolute as Subject has” been achieved or at least attempted with this language. (Hegel, 1977, p12/§23.) Such propositions follow the form ‘God is P’ and their historical presenting can be best found in religion, in Christianity. It is here, alongside language that we can first express Hegel’s conception of Christianity as pertains to this commentary. An example of such a proposition is ‘God is love’ (1 John 4:16). The proposition here is made up of the subject, ‘God’, and the predicate ‘love’. What is true, that is God, the Absolute, is only shown to be so directly; via the predicate. As such, it would seem that ‘God’ is but a “meaningless sound” (Hegel, 1977, p13/§23), in that there is nothing that the subject contributes to the meaning; if ‘God is love’ and in order for us to know this then we could just use ‘love’ alone instead. Equally any qualification one might give for God over and above another word as subject is here, for the most part irrelevant. For while Hegel uses God in order to talk of the Absolute as result, in that very fact he does so to talk of all other subjects as well.
However, in response Hegel immediately clarifies that it in being a subject that ‘God’ self-reflects and is not just mere or universal being, it is in being a subject that we are able to ascertain that He is a subject. Despite this, it is only in anticipation that this is the case or rather, only in seeing the subject as the Notion, or in God’s case seeing Him as the finished end, the Absolute. The predicate proposition “veils the subject-like nature of reality from us.” (Yovel, 2005, p108.) That the subject is only untruly seen is a stated product of the traditional formulation of language. Hegel cannot, however, reformulate language to suit his purpose. This is because language, the entire dialectic as discovered, ultimately the Notion, emerge out from philosophies’ (as dialectic) history. Therefore, in order to come to the Notion one must follow it as such.
Thus, the way Hegel adapts to this issue is by writing not by sentence but by paragraph and larger sections of text, moving between and returning to different issues and in so doing illuminating the issues from many angles. In this passage alone Miller breaks into six sections, each of which ultimately concern the same argument but approach it from differing approaches. Hence, in order to recount Hegel’s argument I have had to cover the entire passage and move about it in a non-linear fashion.
Having grounded a linguistic approach in subjectivity Hegel can address the initial contradiction through mediation. Everything is subjectively immediate or subjectively mediate. That is, depending on the considered point of view whether something appears to be the result of a process or not will change. (Inwood, 2018, p10467.) This mediation cannot be truly stated outside of its system, that is, outside the complete truth. Now if a philosopher of the past were refuting another’s idea, they would have been unaware of their dialectical relationship. That is, they would “mistakenly pay attention solely to its negative action, without awareness of its progress and result on their positive side too.” (Hegel, 1977, p13/§24.) While, in retrospect when a philosopher constructing an actual system of knowledge will look upon the negations as mediated rather than immediate. Each and every negation they negate, insofar as they negate positions in order to transcend them rather than discredit them, knowingly adds to the system positively; the negated position is completed by the dialectic refutation as it solves a problem. (Yovel, 2005, p111.) In so doing, a couple of things can be said about the Absolute.
Firstly, the initial contradiction initiated by the Absolute being a result. In the first instance we can simply say that “the absolute is not simple, but nor is it a mere bearer of predicates,” rather, it is mediated, a systematised collection of what pertains to the Notion. (Inwood, 2018, p10466.) What this ultimately means is that from the pre-dialectical position, fixed in subject/predicate language, all that we were able to ascertain was that the Absolute is the True however, from the new point of view of the dialectic the Absolute has always been the end of the systematic process, the final destination in which we pursue the fullness of the Notion that is this true point of view. Furthermore, for Hegel, “the absolute is essentially incomplete without the world.” (Inwood, 2018, p10467.) We can use this to establish Hegel’s Christian framework and so analyse the entire argument upon my initial premise.
What such subject/predicate religious language such as ‘God is love’ was attempting to communicate was, according to Hegel, just this, “that God [the Absolute] necessarily comes to full self-consciousness in and as human self-consciousness.” (Houlgate, 2005, p252.) Christianity in general expresses the fundamental philosophical truths in a less precise way, using religious imagery to convey these truths. The bible itself is an “interpretation by faith of the life and death in Jesus.” (Houlgate, 2005, p270.) This interpretation is not, however, dispensable, it sets us on the way of reasoning and philosophy is essential to the development of this thought.
It is in this reworking of the gospels that can be found perhaps Hegel’s most initiative theological assertion, that the resurrection is not in the flesh, nor is it necessarily for humans. In Christ’s death, God turns “death into the manifestation of His love.” (Houlgate, 2005, p268.) Interestingly, what in the mature Hegel’s thought became Spirit, in the early Hegel was love. Love, “as the most intense form of human experience [is the] cumulation of the powers of the universe itself.” (Beiser, 2005, p117.) Hence, in the death of God on the cross, love incarnate, Christ, is encountered in Christianity and when taken hold of in faith, Christ “can be opened up in our hearts as the spirit of openness and love.” (Houlgate, 2005, p270.) In other words, the greatest truth, one that can only be known in the modern age of the dialectic Hegelian Philosophy and has only been known in its religion, Christianity, is that the truth is made actual only by God becoming subject.
Now my premise was implicitly that Hegel was writing as a Christian philosopher, on his terms. In short, these are his terms. However, I did not imply that Hegel wrote with these premises in mind. I do not mean to suggest that Hegel created his dialectical system, or rather came upon it, with God, the Absolute, as ultimate premise rather than final conclusion. There is more than enough evidence to suggest he didn’t (see Beiser, 2005, p124-152, for a good account). I have however written this commentary with this as my premise in order that I might posit a potential issue with the methodology if it were the case that Hegel’s philosophy had a similar premise. This premise would not have to be identical to mine, but as far as I can tell, Hegel’s philosophy is sufficiently Christian in grounding (even if not Christian in teaching) for the problem to potentially exist. I have attempted to write this commentary somewhat in keeping with Hegel’s own method to bring out Hegel’s argument as given in the passage, in order that the postulated potential problem be as applicable as possible.
The issue is as follows. In starting, or at least arriving by way of amending the system at a transcendental presupposition of a loving God, a God of spirit, there is the potential to undermine the subjective argument at play. If it is held that the fullness of the Notion is ahead of us in apprehension of the Absolute, of God, and God only becomes God in the fulfilment of the process; how is it that the fullness of the Notion is ahead of us? Furthermore, in this being a Christian presupposition where, ultimately, does the divine love come from if the Notion is ahead? The absolute may pertain to the system and make it work but only in so far as the linguistic method can be justified prior to our encounter with the divine. Otherwise, the Notion is not in fact ahead of us, or the Notion and the Absolute, God, do not in fact function as the logic states. Now this is not to say that Hegel’s logic can’t get around this, in fact it may in pursuing the dialectic through the rest of the work and encountering the divine as epilogue, in the whole.
Bibliography
Beiser, F. (2005) Hegel New York; London: Routledge
Hegel, G., 1977. Phenomenology of Spirit. s.l.:Oxford University Press.
Houlgate, S., 2005. An Introduction to Hegel: Truth, Freedom and History. s.l.:Blackwells.
Inwood, M., 2018. Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit, Translated with Introduction and Commentary. s.l.:Oxford University Press.
Quentin Lauer, S., 1978. A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. s.l.:Fordham Univeristy Press.
Yovel, Y., 2005. Hegel’s Preface to theVhenomenology of Spirit. s.l.:PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.