Theseus Stefanatos – 07/06/2019
Bell Hooks (1989) describes Black people’s lived experience in America as living within the separated ‘Margin’ where Black people are still part of ‘the Whole’ but outside of the dominant main body of society, or what Hooks calls ‘the Centre’ (Ibid.). For those living in this ‘Margin’, the Centre is a place made up of “stores we could not enter, restaurants we could not eat in and people we could not look directly in the face”, and Black people are only allowed access into the ‘Centre’ “within a service capacity, but cannot live there, and must always return to the Margin” (Hooks, 1990: 373). In describing the relationship between the Centre and the Margin, Hooks is explaining how racism exists through what can be described as a cultural hegemony, where the Centre’s culture attempts to dominate the culture of the whole and normalise racism through what she calls “the Hegemonic order of ‘Whiteness’ in society” (Ibid: 374) which economically, politically and culturally demarcates Black people’s world from White people’s, despite these two worlds being interlinked. Hooks, however, sees Marginality not as a site of oppression, but of resistance; the Margin can act as the “central location for counter hegemonic discourse” from which Black people can construct an identity outside the dominant centre and use Marginality as a site of self-expression and social recognition (Ibid: 373).
Floya Anthias defines racism as the belief in race plus the “power to make racism effective” by exerting control over people’s lives (Anthias, 1999: li. 50). Foucault (1975) outlines power as existing through person to person relationships, where the ability to influence and control a person’s action becomes entwined in social interactions (Ibid.). Edward Said’s Post-colonial Theory (1978) argues that belief in race is produced within cultural discourse through “the making of difference”, where White peopleconstruct an image of a fictitious “Other” made up of a distinct and homogenous “essence” of people and interpret any cultural differences as inferiorities (Ibid: 3). Said argues that White discourse surrounding the Other is used by the metropole (or Centre) to legitimise its structural power through a myth of meritocracy (Said, 1993).
In the modern US, right-wing discourse can be seen to echo Orientalism as a means to justifying, or even essentialising the existence of racial inequality, with Fox News perpetuating the narrative that the reason there are a disproportionate number of white people in positions of power is simply the result of “hard work” (Rosen, 2018). Liberal discourses in America also have Orientalist undertones: often politicians in the Democratic Party take a paternalistic approach to resisting racism by dictating the parameters of resistance through narratives that imply that the Democratic party is somehow “better equipped” to tackle racism than Black people themselves (Harriot, 2018). In both instances, such discourses are used to justify white people occupying positions of power in society by echoing imperialist, racist notions of white supremacy in more modern language. Hooks could argue that Marginality can offer Black people an opportunity to challenge these narratives from which the Centre justifies its position of power. Marginality can allow each Black person to express their individuality but also their shared humanity with people in the Centre through cultural discourse, thus delegitimising the Centre’s claim to power by undermining right-wing essentialism’s attempt to homogenise Black people as well undermining liberal paternalism’s attempt to disrespect the agency of Black people. However, providing resistance to racist ideology is not a sufficient form of resistance, because racism is not a product of rational debate. Instead, racism is the product of what Pierre Bourdieu and Richard Nice defined as “habitus” (Bourdieu and Nice, 2000); racist “thoughts” are pre-cognitive and are not developed through reflection, but through social habits which come from the pre-existence of racist power relation (Ibid.). Thus racist discourse should be understood as a by-product or, in Marxist language, a “superstructure” of the material “base” of racist power relations which helps to sustain these relations but does not create these relations (Marx, 2010). Thus, it would not be fruitful to investigate how Marginality can end the centre’s belief in racist ideology, because this belief is not moral or rational, but a by-product of the centre’s power to make racism effective, which only helps to sustain the centre’s power.
This essay will instead analyse the relational power dynamics between the Centre and the Margin which exist as a result of racism, in order to assess the extent to which Marginality can operate as site of resistance to racism. To avoid drawing conclusions that are too broad, this essay will only analyse how marginality can operate as a site of resistance to racism perpetrated against Black people in the USA and will only draw on examples of resistance outside of the USA in order to offer insights on how effective these forms resistance could be if applied in America. This essay will show that while Marginality can successfully negate the power racist discourse has over Back people’s identity by acting as a site of social recognition, Hooks is wrong to suggest that the means of doing so is by offering a “central location for counter hegemonic discourse” (Ibid.) as this would only trap Marginal identity within the parameters of the centre’s discourse, while also denying Black people a truly effective site of self-realisation. Instead, Marginality must reject the construction of all cultural hegemony and act as a site of solidarity and mutual acceptance of individuality, in order to thus act as a true site of social recognition for the entire Margin. However, Marginality is ultimately limited as a site of resistance to intuitional racism because Marginal social recognition alone does not offer a means to resisting structural power because Marginal culture has no roots in material power.
Marginality can operate as a site of self-expression as a means to overcoming the symbolic, psychological violence of racist discourse which manifests in what David Theo Goldberg refers to as ‘Racial Knowledge’ (Godlberg, 2009). Through the “manufacturing of dichotomies”, racist discourse exerts power over Black people “epistemologically in the dual practices of naming and evaluating”; to have the power to name (or not name) is to have the power to decide whether “existence is recognized or refused, significance assigned or ignored, beings elevated or rendered invisible” (Ibid: 226). In relation to Marginality, Goldberg is thus suggesting that by having the power to construct society’s perception of the Margin, the Centre attempt to dominate the construction of the Margin’s identity and self-worth. The extent of this power can be further understood through the theories Axel Honneth outlines in his work Disrespect (Honneth, 2009): racist representation has the phenomenological power of demising a Black person’s self-worth on a subjective level through what Honneth refers to as “the denial of social recognition” (Ibid: 7-9). Honneth argues that people are truly free when they are able to achieve “self-realisation” through the formation of their true identity (Ibid.). He argues that this is achieved through “social-recognition”, where society treats them with honour and dignity, and respects their achievements and their agency thus allowing people to achieve “self-actualisation” by having their individual humanity recognised (Ibid.). The centre’s cultural hegemony thus denies Black people such social-recognition, and it denies individual Black people the means to achieve self-actualisation through a racist discourse which attempts to dehumanise black people.
Marginality can thus operate as a site of resistance by diminishing the subjective significance of racist representation through the construction of counterhegemonic discourse. Marginality offers a space where Black people can find social recognition outside of the discourse of ‘the Centre’ by acting as a site to find self-worth and construct personal identities. The success of this can be seen in the ‘Black is Beautiful’ movement where African-Americans challenged White-centred beauty standards which attempted to essentialise ‘Black’ physical features as being somehow “innately ugly’’ (Anderson, 2018). The movement challenged this by encouraging Black people to embrace and draw value from their natural appearance, which thus created a cultural discourse which allowed Black people to find self-worth through Marginality. Suki Ali argues that the value of the Black is Beautiful movement should not be underestimated by pointing to the damaging psychological impact that having a person’s natural features being seen as ugly can have on a person’s mental health (Ali, 2007). Hooks could thus point to how such examples demonstrate how Marginality can operate as an effective site of resistance by creating a counterhegemony from which to draw social recognition.
Nonetheless, Miah Ramnath questions the extent to which the construction of a counterhegemonic discourse is indeed emancipatory, by pointing to how post-colonial governments failed to truly overcome racism as they became trapped within the parameters of “hegemonic thinking” (Ramnath, 2013: 8). Often in the aftermath of a colonial struggle against a racist hegemonic culture, post-colonial governments attempted to replace Western hegemonic discourse with a new, nationalist cultural hegemony, however Ramnath argues that all counter hegemonies fail to be truly emancipatory as they lead to the creation of new Margins (Ibid.). This can be seen in examples such as the Arab Nationalist governments in the Maghreb which followed a policy of “Arabisation”, embracing so-called “Arab” culture by creating a generalised image of what it meant to be “Arab” (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). In constructing an image of the Self in relation to the Other, Arab Nationalism in Algeria disenfranchised indigenous Amazigh people who had formally fought with Arabs to overcome colonialism, by suppressing their culture through the censorship of Amazigh symbols (Ibid). Such examples can help demonstrate Ramnath’s argument, as they show how the creation of counterhegemonic discourse can result in the creation of new Margins replacing the old.
However, going further, counterhegemonic discourse in general fails to stop racist culture having power over the lives of people living within the Margin when it is constructed in relation to racist discourses. In the context of Algeria, French hegemonic discourse Orientalised and dehumanised Algerian people by portraying Algerian cultural practices and traditions as evidence for why Algerians were “backwards” and “uncivilised” (Mostari, 2004). In response to this, both during the independence struggle and in government, the Federation de Liberation Nationale embarked on the “Arabisation” of Algeria, embracing the cultural practices and traditions the French tried to demonise by encouraging the adoption of local customs and traditions as part of the construction of an “Arab” identity; while at the same time creating a discourse of resistance to colonialism by attacking French influences over Algerian culture (Ibid). In doing so, the FLN was thus embracing Marginality as a site of resistance, only on an international scale, by constructing a counterhegemonic cultural discourse centred around ‘Arabisation’ which helped Algerians find social recognition outside of French cultural imperialism.
Nevertheless, by redefining Algerian culture so strongly in opposition to French racism, the FLN was still allowing racist discourse to influence Algerian people’s lives by allowing French discourse to still have an impact on Algerian culture. This is a reflection of the fact that any counter culture is itself dependent on the dominant culture upon which it builds off of – the creation of a counter hegemonic discourse in opposition to the dominant Centre results in Marginality being trapped within the parameters set by the Centre because it leads to Marginal identity constructing itself through the Centre by defining itself from its discourses, thus making the existence of Marginal culture dependent upon it. In the context of the US, such examples help show that the construction of any counterhegemony would necessarily result in the spectre of racism still having power over Black people’s lives by allowing racism to dictate the parameters that Black self-expression and social recognition can have within the Margin.
Furthermore, the construction of any cultural hegemony, no matter how independent it is from the centre, entails some degree of homogenisation by virtue of its ontology, as a cultural hegemony exists through the power it has to force people to conform to it. The FLN’s invention of a hegemonic ‘Arab’ identity placed social pressure on Algerian people to conform to a contrived image of what it meant to be “Arab” based around broadly conservative values – ignoring the cultural diversity of Algerian people (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). As a result, Algerian people were only able to gain social-recognition by conforming to this new counter cultural hegemony, as those who transgressed from “Arab” hegemonic culture were denied social-recognition, as seen with the exclusion of Working-class Algerian culture from mainstream cultural institutions (Ibid.). This is because all hegemonic culture is,in the Marxist sense, “alienating” (1847) in that it forces people to estrange themselves from who they are and become what the dominant culture tells them to be in order to exercise any power in society (Ibid.). Thus, even though the construction of Marginal countercultural hegemony does provide a means to rebalancing the relational power dynamics between the margin and the Centre by offering a new avenue for social recognition outside the Centre; the construction of countercultural hegemony would still result in Black people being denied the right to self-expression, as the pressure to conform to Marginal culture would only create a power relationship on an intrapersonal level between the self and the estranged self.
This does not necessarily discredit Hooks view that Marginality can act as a site of resistance, but what it does suggest is that in order to do so Marginality must abolish cultural hegemony in general. To accomplish this Marginality must also be a site of solidarity: in countering the Centre’s hegemonic culture it must not replace it with a counter hegemonic culture, but an anti-hegemonic culture which embraces individuality and difference through the absence of any cultural hegemony, in order to become accepting of all self-expression within the Margin – only then can Marginality effectively operate as a means to social recognition for all members of the Margin. Thus, Hooks’ theory is flawed in its analysis of how Marginality operates as a site of resistance; marginality would fail as a site of resistance to racism if it did so by creating, as Hooks suggests, a “counterhegemonic discourse” (Ibid.), as this would result in the creation of any new culture of resistance being trapped within the parameters of racist discourse; while also still denying self-realisation for people living in the margin because all cultural hegemony forces conformity. However, if Marginality can instead create a space free from cultural hegemony by embracing the diversity and individuality of every member of the Black community and by creating a discourse of acceptance, then this would allow Black people to find social recognition through self-expression, and only then would marginality operate as a true site of resistance to racism.
The ultimate limitation of Marginality as a site of resistance is that social recognition alone cannot provide marginalised people with a means of overcoming racism, because the emancipatory power of social recognition is contingent on the material power of the group which provides it. Anthias (1999) argues that that the effects of racism are not only discursive but material – racism not only results in the denial of social recognition, but also material exclusion by limiting the extent to which Black people can access positions of economic and political power (Ibid). Honneth’s theory is too simplistic in its assertion that social recognition directly leads to self-realisation, as he ignores the role power plays in allowing social recognition to be a means to self-realisation. Anthias argues, “Racist ideas about groups and the effects of Racism are the products of discursive and material forces” which emerge in “a field of contestation and negotiation in society” and lead to different groups controlling various institutions of power (Ibid). What this argument suggests is that a prominent reason for why racist discourse is able to deny a Black person self-realisation is because racists have the institutional power to influence Black people’s lives, either by denying Black people access to positions of power within institutions or by using these institutions to enforce racist power relations.
This can be elaborated upon through an understanding of the relationship between social recognition, relational power and Cultural Capital. Bourdieu (1986) outlines three forms of capital: Social Capital, which comprises the interpersonal relationships a person can have which can result in higher status and greater social mobility, such as having friends who are in positions of institutional power who can in turn empower you; Economic capital, which comprises a person’s money, private property andfinancial assets which can exert economic power over others; and Cultural Capital which is a social asset which “functions as a social-relation within an economy of practices (system of exchange), and comprises all of the material and symbolic goods, without distinction, that society considers rare and worth seeking” (Ibid: 4). From these definitions, it appears that Capital in general can be defined as an asset which can translate into relational power. Bourdieu argues that cultural capital can take the formof “Embodied Cultural Capital”, such as knowledge of culture and traditions deemed worthy by society; “Objectified Cultural Capital”, such as the possession of objects which society deems desirable; as well as “Institutionalised Cultural Capital”, such as admiration from a respected institution (Ibid: 3). Thus, to use the language of Honneth and Foucault, it follows that cultural capital can be only accumulated by a person receiving social recognition which can translate into relational power. This implies that the emancipatory power of social recognition is contingent on the hierarchal status of the group which is granting it, as it is far more empowering to be respected by a group or institution with roots in economic and social capital, than by those without such capital. To use Hooks’ language, the Centre is thus the gatekeeper of cultural capital given that it has such a stranglehold on economic and social capital through White people in the US disproportionately controlling its economic and political institutions.
The effects of this can be seen in the ‘Black is Beautiful’ movement: even though the movement succeeded in its intention of reaffirming Black people’s self-worth within the margin; the dominant institutions of the centre, in this case the fashion industry and media surrounding it – institutions which exert power over both the margin and the centre – still generally subscribe to racist white- centred beauty standards and still uses them to exclude Black people from succeeding in the fashion industry, evident by the disproportionately low number of successful Black models (Elan, 2016). What this demonstrates is that a person will always accrue more cultural capital through centrality than through Marginality, as social recognition which stems from a counterhegemonic culture cannot blossom into cultural capital because countercultures have no roots in institutional power – by definition, a counter-culture grows from opposition to institutional power.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that Marginality can operate as a site of resistance to the power racism has on Black people’s self-perception by offering a space to acquire social recognition. However, Marginality is limited in the extent to which it can operate as a site of empowerment without first ending the institutional power the Centre has over Black people’s lives. What this suggests is that any fight to resist racism through Marginality must do so by rooting Marginality as a site of resistance institutionally, and not only culturally, either by establishing a form of material independence from the centre, or by fighting to democratise the ‘whole’ and abolish the centre all together. It may be unrealistic to expect anti-racist resistance to immediately abolish the centre’s power over the lives of people living within the Margin, but what this does suggest is that the Margin must always strive to fight the centre’s institutional hegemony with as much force as it fights its cultural hegemony, so that the Marginality can one day operate as a true site of true self-actualisation.
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